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A Quest for Some Certainty: Guideline (1968)
and Task Force (1969) Approaches to Merger Law
Thomas M. Kerr*
BACKGROUND
In the United States, there was not effective law respecting corpo-
rate acquisitions and mergers until the Celler-Kefauver Act amend-
ments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950. Before 1950, the "assets
loophole" in Section 7 of Clayton as passed in 1914 permitted corpo-
rate managers to acquire other firms at will simply by acquiring assets
rather than stock. Congress closed the loophole and sought to have an
effective merger law by the 1950 amendment.
The following discussion of the legislative history of Section 7, as
amended in 1950, is taken from the majority opinion in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,'
In the course of the hearings conducted in both the Eightieth
and Eighty-first Congresses, a more far-reaching examination of
the purposes and provisions of §7 was undertaken. A review of
the legislative history of these amendments provides no unmistak-
ably clear indication of the precise standards the Congress wished
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts to apply in judging
the legality of particular mergers. However, sufficient expressions
of a consistent point of view may be found in the hearings, com-
mittee reports of both the House and Senate and in floor debate
to provide those charged with enforcing the Act with a usable
frame of reference within which to evaluate any given merger.
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of
the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.
Apprehension in this regard was bolstered by the publication in
1948 of the Federal Trade Commission's study on corporate mer-
gers. Statistics from this and other current studies were cited as
evidence of the danger to the American economy in unchecked
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Lecturer in In-
dustrial Administration and Law, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-
Mellon University. A former Business Economist and then a Trial Attorney with the
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, he is a member of the Committee
on Practice and Procedure, American Bar Association Section on Antitrust Law. A.B.,
1940, Lafayette College; J.D., 1950, The George Washington University Law School.
1. 370 U.S. 294, 312-18 (1962).
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corporate expansions through mergers. 2 Other considerations cited
in support of the bill were the desirability of retaining "local con-
trol" over industry and the protection of small businesses. Through-
out the recorded discussion may be found examples of Congress'
fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on
economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend
toward concentration was thought to pose.
What were some of the factors, relevant to a judgment as to
the validity of a given merger, specifically discussed by Congress
in redrafting §7?
First, there is no doubt that Congress did wish to 'plug the loop-
hole' and to include within the coverage of the Act the acquisi-
tion of assets no less than the acquisition of stock.
Second, by the deletion of the 'acquiring-acquired' language
in the original text, it hoped to make plain that §7 applied not
only to mergers between actual competitors, but also to vertical
and conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend to lessen com-
petition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.2
Third, it is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a bar-
rier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic con-
centration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at
a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of
commerce was still in its incipiency. Congress saw the process of
concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought
to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power
to brake this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum.
Most important to the inquiry and discussion in this article. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren's discussion in his Brown Shoe majority opinion
went on to consider the economic tests that seemed to be indicated by
Congress when it amended Section 7 in 1950: The decision continued:
[W]hile providing no definitive quantitative or qualitative tests4
2. The House Report on the amendments summarized its view of the situation: "That
the current merger movement [during the years 1940-1947] has had a significant effect on
the economy is clearly revealed by the fact that the asset value of the companies which
have disappeared through mergers amounts to 5.2 billion dollars, or no less than 5.5 per
cent of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations-a significant segment of the
economy to be swallowed up in such a short period of time." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3.
3. That § 7 was intended to apply to all mergers-horizontal, vertical or conglomerate
-was specifically reiterated by the House Report on the final bill. H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11.
4. The House Report on H.R. 2734 stated that two tests of illegality were included in
the proposed Act: whether the merger substantially lessened competition or tended to
create a monopoly. It stated that such effects could be perceived through findings, for
example, that a whole or material part of the competitive activity of an enterprise, which
had been a substantial factor in competition, had been eliminated; that the relative size
of the acquiring corporation had increased to such a point that its advantage over com-
petitors threatened to be "decisive"; that an "undue" number of competing enterprises
Vol. 8: 95, 1969-1970
Approaches to Merger Law
by which enforcement agencies could gauge the effects of a given
merger to determine whether it may 'substantially' lessen com-
petition or tend toward monopoly, Congress indicated plainly
that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of
its particular industry. That is, whether the consolidation was
to take place in an industry that was fragmented rather than con-
centrated, that had seen a recent trend toward domination by a
few leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its distribution
of market shares among the participating companies, that had ex-
perienced easy access to markets by suppliers and easy access to
suppliers by buyers or had witnessed foreclosure of business, that
had witnessed foreclosure of business, that had witnessed the
ready entry of new competition or the erection of barriers to pro-
spective entrants, all were aspects, varying in importance with
the merger under consideration, which would properly be taken
into account.
* , * Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen
competition' (emphasis supplied), to indicate that its concern was
with probabilities, not certainties.5 Statutes existed for dealing
with clear-cut menaces to competition; no statute was sought for
dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers with a probable
anti-competitive effect were to be proscribed by this Act. .. .
There are two fundamentals basic to this discussion:
had been eliminated; or that buyers and sellers in the relevant market had established
relationships depriving their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete. H.R. Rep. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8. Each of these standards, couched in general language, reflects a
conscious avoidance of exclusively mathematical tests even though the case of Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, said to have created a "quantitative
substantiality" test for suits arising under § 3 of the Clayton Act, was decided while
Congress was considering H.R. 2734. Some discussion of the applicability of this test to
§ 7 cases ensued, see, e.g., S. Hearings on H.R. 2734, at 31-32, 169-172; S. Rep. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 21; 96 Cong. Rec. 16643, but this aspect of the Standard Oil decision
was neither specifically endorsed nor impugned by the bill's supporters. However, the
House Judiciary Committee's Report, issued two months after Standard Oil had been
decided, remarked that the tests of illegality under the new Act were intended to be
"similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used
in other sections of the Clayton Act." H.R. RaP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8.
5. In the course of both the Committee hearings and floor debate, attention was
occasionally focused on the issue of whether "possible," "probable" or "certain" anti-
competitive effects of a proposed merger would have to be proven to establish a violation
of the Act. Language was quoted from prior decisions of the Court in antitrust cases in
which each of these interpretations of the word "may" was suggested as appropriate. The
final Senate Report on the question was explicit on the point: "The use of these words
["may be"] means that the bill, if enacted, would not apply to the mere possibility but
only to the reasonable probability of the prescribed [sic] effect. . . . The words 'may be'
have been in section 7 of the Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of reasonable prob-
ability conveyed by these words is a necessary element in any statute which seeks to
arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged
restraints violative of the Sherman Act. A requirement of certainty and actuality of
injury to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act
by reaching incipient restraints." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6.
6. 370 U.S. 294, 320-23.
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1.. Whether there are benefits to the economy and society to use
legal sanctions to encourage corporations to expand by internal
growth rather than by external acquisition; and
2. Whether a modern economy is capable of making such a deci-
sion, given the present state of available empirical data and
economic evidence.
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW, 1950-1967
Congress having made new and seemingly effective law in 1950 and
having made its intent quite clear, as is indicated in the Brown Shoe
excerpts above, it remained to the Federal Trade Commission and
the courts in particular cases to determine the meaning of a statute
so broad as to say that no corporation shall make an acquisition where,
"...the effect of such acquistion may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or to tend to create a monopoly. . . ." In this determination
perhaps the key words Congress delivered to the courts and the Com
mission were "may be".
Although slow in coming at the beginning, the cases came down
In 1962 the court in Brown Shoe spoke clearly and decisively respect-
ing both horizontal mergers (mergers between direct competitors) and
vertical mergers (those between firms which are in a direct line from
raw materials to sales). Brown was the fourth largest shoe manufac-
turer in the country producing about four per cent of the nation's
total footwear product. The top four manufacturers produced ap-
proximately 23 per cent of the nation's shoes. Kinney, which Brown
acquired, was a retail shoe store chain, making about 1.2 per cent of
all national retail shoe sales by dollar volume. Before and at the time
of the acquisition there had been a "definite trend" among shoe manu-
facturers to acquire retail outlets. Brown Shoe had participated ac-
tively in this industry trend. The Supreme Court's decision noted
the effect of the acquisition on competition:
At the time of the merger, Kinney bought no shoes from Brown;
however, in line with Brown's conceded reasons for acquiring
Kinney, Brown had, by 1957, become the largest outside supplier
of Kinney's shoes, supplying 7.9 per cent of all Kinney's needs.7
The Supreme Court had noted a similar effect flowing from a ver-
tical acquisition in 1957 when deciding the appeal of a case brought
7. Id. at 303-04.
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under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, before the 1950 amendment. In
United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company (General Mo-
tors)8, Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion observed:
.... that DuPont purposely employed its stock [a 23% stock in-
terest in General Motors Corporation] to pry open the General
Motors market to entrench itself as the primary supplier of Gen-
eral Motors' requirements for automotive finishes and fabrics.9
Thus the effect of vertical acquisitions upon competition was clear:
the opportunities of competing suppliers or outlets were excluded by
the common interest between the acquiring and the acquired firms.
Quantitative factors (see the Brown and Kinney percentages) consid-
ered were relatively small.
The developing cases began to give quantitative indicia to managers
and counsel advising corporations. Brown Shoe indicated that an ac-
quisition by Brown, manufacturing four per cent of the nation's shoes,
of Kinney, manufacturing 0.5 per cent, and by Brown possessing 7.2
per cent of shoe stores of Kinney having 1.2 per cent of national retail
shoe sales, was considered beyond the pale. The Supreme Court said:
The market share which companies may control by merging
is one of the most important factors to be considered when deter-
mining the probable effects of the combination on effective com-
petition in the relevant market. In an industry as fragmented as
shoe retailing, the control of substantial shares of the trade in a
city may have important effects on competition. If a merger achiev-
ing 5 per cent control were now approved, we might be required
to approve future merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking
similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid
would then be furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve the
combinations previously approved. Furthermore, in this frag-
mented industry, even if the combination controls but a small share
of a particular market, the fact that this share is held by a large
national chain can adversely affect competition. Testimony in the
record from numerous independent retailers, based on their ac-
tual experience in the market, demonstrates that a strong, na-
tional chain of stores can insulate selected outlets from the vagaries
of competition in particular locations and that the large chains
can set and alter styles in footwear to an extent that renders the
independents unable to maintain competitive inventories. A third
significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large national
8. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
9. Id. at 606.
Duquesne Law Review
chain which is integrated with a manufacturing operation. The
retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufactur-
ing division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at
prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of course,
some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are
beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlaw-
ful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely
affected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act pro-
tects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented indus-
tries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in
favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.10
In 1964, the Supreme Court handed down another horizontal ac-
quisition decision. United States v. Aluminum Company of America
(Rome Cable)," Aluminum Company of America had acquired the
stock and assets of Rome Cable Corporation. Alcoa, the leading pro-
ducer of aluminum conductor, controlled 27.8 per cent of the market.
Rome had, in the words of the majority decision, "only 1.3" per cent
of the aluminum conductor market. The court noted an oligopolistic
market in which Alcoa was the leader, since Alcoa and its competitor,
Kaiser, controlled 50 per cent, and Alcoa and its three leading com-
petitors controlling more than 76 per cent of the aluminum conductor
market. The court said:
The acquisition of Rome added, it is said, only 1.3 per cent to
Alcoa's control of the aluminum conductor market. But in this
setting that seems to us reasonably likely to produce a substantial
lessening of competition within the meaning of §7. It is the basic
premise of that law that competition will be most vital "when
there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share."...... It would seem that the situation in the aluminum in-
dustry may be oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater
is the likelihood that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not
competition, will emerge. That tendency may well be thwarted by
the presence of small but significant competitors. Though per-
centagewise Rome may have seemed small in the year prior to
the merger, it ranked ninth among all companies and fourth
among independents in the aluminum conductor market; and in
10. 370 U.S. 294, 342-44 (1962).
11. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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the insulated aluminum field it ranked eight and fourth respec-
tively. Furthermore, in the aluminum conductor market, no more
than a dozen companies could account for as much as I per cent
of industry production in any one of the five years (1955-1959)
for which statistics appear in the record. Rome's competition was
therefore substantial. 12
Then in 1966, seemingly in order to make things crystal clear, the
Supreme Court examined the 1960 horizontal merger between two
retail grocery chains in Los Angeles. The retail sales of Von's Grocery
Co. ranked third in the area and Shopping Bag's ranked sixth. Von's
sought to merge with Shopping Bag, and in 1960 their combined sales
amounted to 7.5 per cent of the retail groceries sold in the Los Angeles
market.The merger created the second largest grocery chain in Los
Angeles with sales of about $170 million annually. The Supreme
Court found the Von's-Shopping Bag merger violative of Section 7 in
U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co.13
These and other horizontal and vertical cases developing in the years
after the 1950 amendment made it clear that the United States Su-
preme Court was carefully reading the intention of Congress and the
vast broadness of its words, prohibiting any acquisition whose "...ef-
fect... may be substantially to lessen competition."
It became clear to managers and their counsel that horizontal and
vertical mergers were dangerous business. Accordingly these kinds of
merger activities declined. Horizontal and vertical mergers represented
48 per cent of all mergers from 1952 to 1959; 39 per cent of all mer-
gers from 1960 to 1963; 22 per cent from 1964 to 1967; and only 9
per cent in 1968.14 Conversely, conglomerate mergers sharply increased
from 38.1 per cent of all mergers in 1948 to 1951; to 91 per cent of all
mergers in 1968.15
Obviously the conglomerate merger trend is the response of corpo-
rate counsel to the warnings given by the courts in the vertical and
horizontal cases cited, as well as in other cases. Early in this period the
advice of corporate counsel assumed great trepidation. His employer,
the manager, often had merger aspirations and it was up to counsel to
assay the risks. As the cases developed, it became more and more evident
12. Id. at 280-81.
13. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).




that risks in the horizontal and vertical area were exceedingly great and
counsel must often say "No" and be confident that he had given the
best advice.
There were dire pitfalls, however. The tale is reliably repeated about
the general counsel of a medium size manufacturing organization who
during this period advised his managers that they could not make a
horizontal acquisition of a small competitor. Also immediately there-
after the largest, and much larger, competitor of our counsel-hero's
manufacturer obtained a release from the government to permit them to
acquire the small firm, by advocating the failing company doctrine.
International Shoe v. Federal Trade Commission;16 Citizen Publishing
Company v. United States.'1 The story ends that counsel-hero went
to seek other employment.
With significant vertical and horizontal acquisitions clearly prohib-
itive, the conglomerate remained. As has been seen, conglomerate
activity burgeoned. As might have been predicted, alarm grew. In
January, 1969, a "Cabinet Committee on Price Stability" released a
report stating that 200 firms hold 58.7 per cent of the nation's manu-
facturing assets, and that only 100 firms hold 47.6 per cent of such
assets.' 8 Referring to ". . .special financial and speculative consid-
erations. . ." rather than technological imperatives of efficiency as
explaining this degree of concentration, the report went on to call
for vigorous antitrust enforcement. The legal technician must ask the
following question: How does the conglomerate act so that, ". . .the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition..."?
The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability asserted that conglomer-
ates, ". . .weaken competition by removing significant competitors,
raising entry barriers, and increasing business reciprocity opportun-
ties..."
Among its recommendations, this Committee suggested that con-
glomerate firms submit financial reports division by division. The
Committee felt that the Clayton Act needed to be strengthened and
was inadequate to cope with the "conglomerate problem." The first
six months of 1969 were replete with similar reports from many dif-
ferent sources.
About the same time the AFL-CIO took a position on the matter.
16. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
17. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
18. 394 BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATIONS REORT A-2, June 28, 1969.
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In the February, 1969 issue of The American Federationist, its official
monthly magazine, an article reviewed some of the reasons for the
Federation's current concern with business conglomerates. Noting that
the concern is not with large conglomerate corporations merely be-
cause they are large, the author, Ray MacDonald, examined the effects.
His immediate questions concern plant close down, collective bar-
gaining and impact on the local community. Beyond this, he asked
what does the concentration of economic power do to the political
system and economic system, in terms of prices, competition, efficiency,
and investiveness?19
The article also touched on the accounting aspect of conglomerate
takeovers and remarked about the lack of divisional reporting by the
huge corporations. MacDonald noted that while the lack of divisional
reporting unquestionably affects the ability of security analysts to eval-
uate conglomerates, it "also muddles the waters of collective bargain-
ing. '" 20 He added: "Evaluation of a firm's financial position ranks
high in priority on the collective bargaining checklist. As firms con-
glomerate-and there is no reporting on the operations of the separate
and varied divisions-'ability to pay' becomes tangled in arguments
over the operations of each division, with relevant facts usually with-
held from stockholders, workers, and public." 21
MacDonald suggested that the Securities and Exchange Commission
"should require corporations to report in detail on the operations of
their different divisions, in addition to the present requirement of
general financial reporting on the operations of the corporation as a
whole. 22
In closing, MacDonald offered this view:
The details that may become available through the FTC study
and congressional investigations should indicate much more clearly
than is now known the impact and problems of the conglomerate
mergers and the trend toward increasingly concentrated economic
power. This information should lead to a careful review of gov-
ernment policy tailored to the needs of the health and vigor of
the national economy and a democratic society.23
Counsel had been perplexed before with respect to vertical and hor-
19. MacDonald, A Conglomerate: Corporate Octopus, THE AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST,
February, 1969.
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 23.
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izontal mergers pending the development of cases. Now the managers,
deprived of their opportunity for vertical and horizontal activity, were
clamoring for advice from their counsel so that they could make con-
glomerate acquisitions. Here once again counsel had little to guide
him. It was clear that if the acquisition resulted in reciprocal business
arrangements that it was likely to fall. Federal Trade Commission v.
Consolidated Foods Corp.,2 4 United States v. General Dynamics Corp.2 5
It was also likely that if a conglomerate was of the "product extension"
variety, enabling an already established firm untoward opportunities
for distribution and marketing of the acquired firm's products, that
the acquisition might be seriously attacked. Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Procter & Gamble Co.26 "Deep pocket" aspects too were dan-
gerous. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission .2  Amid
this perplexity in 1969, a new administration turned the burner up
further. In an address on March 6, 1969, the new Assistant Attorney
General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, Richard W. McLaren,
said:
There is one phase of substantive antitrust law on which I have
already expressed some views that differ from those of the prior
Administration. That is on the question of mergers, and partic-
ularly conglomerate mergers. I have expressed serious concern over
the severe human and economic dislocations which are resulting
from the current tax-propelled merger mania. I do not think we
know at this time whether or not the Celler-Kefauver Act will
reach so-called 'pure' conglomerate mergers. But I believe we can
and should go after some big-company mergers of a somewhat
'purer' conglomerate nature than have been ruled on by the Su-
preme Court thus far. In my view, many such mergers have a
dangerous potential for substantially lessening competition-in
a variety of ways-as well as for unduly increasing concentration.
You can expect that we at the Antitrust Division will be exam-
ining such mergers with the utmost care. And it is only fair to
say-as I indicated last week-that we expect to move rather
promptly in some such cases. 28
During the preceding administration, McLaren's predecessor, Don-
ald F. Turner, on behalf of the Department of Justice, had at one
24. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
25. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
27. 309 F.2d 223 (C.A.D.C. 1962).
28. Some Tentative Views on Antitrust Organization and Policy, Address before the
National Industrial Conference Board, New York.
-1.04
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point suggested proposed legislation that would prohibit any company
among the largest 50 or 100 to acquire any other company, unless it
simultaneously divested itself of other assets of comparable size 29
By mid-sping, 1969, the new Assistant Attorney General, McLaren,
was making repeated appearances similarly opposed to conglomerate
activity, and the manager and his counsel considering a conglomerate
were clearly playing a game in an undefined arena.
A CALL FOR GUIDELINES
Some degree of certainty or predictability in application of Section
7 of the Clayton Act has long been the hopeful dream of lawyers ad-
vising managers, as well as an essential need of government enforce-
ment agencies. Several years ago, Commissioner Phillip Elman, of the
Federal Trade Commission, proposed at a Federal Bar Association
briefing conference in Washington, D.C., that the Commission study
merger economics in particular industries and prepare rules or guide-
lines defining the type or size of merger it would proceed against in
each industry. Also, when former Assistant Attorney General Donald
F. Turner, who had his Ph.D. in economics as well as a law degree,
was appointed to his post in mid-1965, he stated that he would soon
issue merger guidelines, as well as other types of "guidelines."
Actually the Federal Trade Commission began to issue some very
limited guidelines in 1967. These were the first merger guidelines or
acquisition guidelines issued by any government agency. As a result
of studies in four, and only four, industries-food, manufacturing
and distribution, ready-mixed concrete, and textile mill products-
the Commission has released statements of enforcement policies for
these industries since January, 1967. These will be further discussed
below.
Perhaps the most prestigious outcry for guidelines or standards was
that of Mr. Justice Harlan concurring in 1967 in the Procter & Gamble
conglomerate-product extension merger case.30 He said:
I... believe that it is incumbent upon us to make a careful study
of the facts and opinions below in this case, and at least to embark
upon the formulation of standards for the application of Section
7 to mergers which are neither horizontal nor vertical and which
29. New York Times, Feb. 13, 1968, at 31 col. I.
30. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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previously have not been considered in depth by this Court....
My prime difficulty with the Court's opinion is that it makes no
effort in this direction at all, and leaves the Commission, lawyers,
and businessmen at large as to what is to be expected of them in
future cases of this kind.31
At the outset, it seems to me that there is a serious question
whether the state of our economic knowledge is sufficiently
advanced to enable a sure-footed administrative or judicial
determination to be made a priori of substantial anticompe-
titive effect in mergers of this kind. It is clear enough that
Congress desired that conglomerate and product-extension
mergers be brought under §7 scrutiny, but well-versed econo-
mists have argued that such scrutiny can never lead to a valid
finding of illegality.3 2
Thus, while fully agreeing that mergers of this kind are not
to be regarded as something entirely set apart from scrutiny
under §7, I am of the view that when this Court does under-
take to establish the standards for judging their legality, it
should proceed with utmost circumspection. Meanwhile with
this case before us, I cannot escape the necessity of venturing
my own views as to some of the governing standards.33
Only by focusing on market structure can we begin to formu-
late standards which will allow the responsible agencies to give
proper consideration to such mergers and allow businessmen
to plan their actions with a fair degree of certainty.34
In the lengthy concurring opinion Mr. Justice Harlan attempted
to promulgate some such guides or standards. He summarized:
[F]our important guides to the adjudication of conglomerate
or product-extension mergers under §7 seem to come forward.
First, the decision can rest on analysis of market structure with-
out resort to evidence of post-merger anticompetitive behavior.
Second, the operation of the premerger market must be under-
stood as the foundation of successful analysis. The responsible
agency may presume that the market operates in accord with
generally accepted principles of economic theory, but the pre-
31. Id. at 583.
32. Id. at 587.
33. Id. at 589.
34. (Emphasis added). Id. at 592.
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sumption must be open to the challenge of alternative opera-
tional formulations. Third, if it is reasonably probable that there
will be a change in market structure which will allow the exer-
cise of substantially greater market power, then a prima facie case
has been made out under §7. Fourth, where the case against the
merger rests on the probability of increased market power, the
merging companies may attempt to prove there are countervailing
economies reasonably probable which should be weighed against
the adverse effects.3 5
In this 1967 opinion Mr. Justice Harlan undertakes an evident
struggle with the problem of creating some standards for conglomerate
mergers. It may be said that he did more in this opinion to create
some effort toward guidelines than the Department of Justice and the
FTC put together up to that time. Also, his opinion obviously goaded
them into issuing the standards they later produced.
With respect to Mr. Justice Harlan's "four important guides," he
noted first that if the admission of post-merger evidence is permitted
the acquiring company can dissimulate market power during the
period of the observation between acquisition and hearing or trial. It
would be unrealistic, he noted, to assume that market power would be
used adversely during an investigation pending a proceeding.
Next, Mr. Justice Harlan discussed two separate structural con-
siderations: The degree of concentration in the existing market and
the "condition of entry."
The pre-merger market in Procter & Gamble had been asserted
to be one of high concentration with a large market share enjoyed
by the leading firms. But the contrary view had noted the presence in
the market of 200 small competitors, (Clorox had 48.8 per cent of
the national market; Purex had 15.7 per cent, and was second largest.
There were 200 or more small, local, regional competitors). Harlan
pointed out that ". . . domination is an elusive term, for dominance
in terms of percentage of sales is not the equivalent of dominance
in terms of control over price or other aspects of market behavior."36
"The determinative issue is," he added, "how the sellers transact
and establish the pattern of market behavior. The significance of
concentration analysis is that it allows measurement of one easily
determined variable to serve as an opening key to the pattern of
35. Id. at 598-99.
36. Id. at 594.
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market behavior. ' 37 Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that where oligop-
olistic behavior is charged and is offered in evidence as a matter of
structure or as a pattern of behavior, he would allow the defendent
to introduce evidence designed to show that the actual operation of
the market did not accord with oligopolistic theory or whatever other
theory the proponents of the case desired to apply. But most im-
portant, Mr. Justice Harlan would want the defendant to be able tc
offer proof of "efficiencies."s
The courts have not always felt or held that Congress was necessarily
seeking only "efficiencies" under the monopoly or merger laws. The
words of Learned Hand in Alcoa are recalled. "[Congress] . .. was not
necessarily activated by economic motives alone. It is possible because
of its indirect social or moral effect to prefer a system of small pro-
ducers each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character,
to one for which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few."39 Or, from the majority opinion in Proctor &
Gamble: "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may
also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of pro-
tecting competition. ' 40
It will be remembered that in Brown Shoe, Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren's decision said, ". . . we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of de-
centralization." 4'
This Jeffersonianism is a thread woven through many monopoly
and merger decisions. Thus, in Bethlehem-Youngstown, District Judge
Weinfeld says, "... demonstrable benefits are irrelevant and afford no
defense." 42
Mr. Justice Harlan makes some sensible cry for consideration of
economies. He urges that economies achieved by one firm may stimu-
late matching innovations by others. Where this is present, competi-
tion has obviously not been lessened. Also the advantages of com-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 597.
39. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). The court here also referring to Brown Shoe.
41. 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
42. 168 F. Supp. 576, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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petition have not been lost, but instead, are present. He asks, citing
Turner, that the record in any particular case be open to receive such
indications.4 3 Thus he gave his fourth "guide," that the merging com-
panies may attempt to prove that there are countervailing economies
reasonably probable which should be weighed against the adverse
effects, if any, of the merger.
Of course, it is a very fundamental question whether Mr. Justice
Harlan's call for economic standards of the kinds which have been
cited are at all relevant in the face of the Jeffersonian pronounce-
ments which seem to overlook, or at least subordinate, mere economic
considerations.
"GUIDELINES"
Of the two government agencies directly concerned, the Federal
Trade Commission was the first to attempt to publish guidelines or stan-
dards to assist managers and their counsel toward some certainty in these
perplexities. The Federal Trade Commission publications began on
January 3, 1967, with successive publications thereafter. 44 In addition,
the Federal Trade Commission attempted to be of help and assistance
by making public, on February 13, 1968, digests of 26 pre-merger
advisory opinions which had been made for particular industrial
inquirers by the Commission. These were, ". . . released pursuant
to a recent Commission decision to publish significant and pertinent
pre-merger clearance actions. .... 45
The FTC releases each refer to a particular narrowly defined in-
dustry. Each refers to a particular problem which has been before the
Commission. Given this narrow compass for each effort, the Com-
mission is able to offer precise determinations. For instance, in the
cement and ready-mixed concrete manufacturers policy statement, the
Commission states that as a matter of its enforcement policy it will
43. 386 U.S. 568, 598 (1967).
44. They were:
"Enforcement policy with respect to vertical mergers in the cement industry" (FTC,
January 3, 1967), TRADE REG. REP. Vol. 1, Par. 4510.
"Enforcement policy with respect to mergers in the food distribution industries" (FTC,
January 3, 1967), TADE REG. REP., Vol. 1, Par. 4520.
"Enforcement policy with respect to product-extension mergers in grocery products
manufacturing" (FTC, May 15, 1968), TRADE REG. REP., Vol. 1, Par. 4530.
"Enforcement policy with respect to mergers in the textile mill products industry,"
(FTC, November 11, 1968), TR"AD REG. REP., Vol. 1, Par. 4540.
All of the above are available from the Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20580.
45. FTC News Release.
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investigate every future acquisition by a cement manufacturer of
any substantial ready-mixed concrete firm in any market to which
such acquiring cement producer was an actual or potential supplier.
The Commission states that in general the acquisition of any ready-
mixed concrete firm ranking among the leading four non-integrated
ready-mixed producers in any market, or the acquisition of any ready-
mixed producer regularly purchasing 50,000 barrels of cement or
more annually would be considered a substantial acquisition.
In its release respecting mergers in the food distribution industry,
the Commission said it would give specific enforcement considera-
tion to acquisitions by retail food chains which result in a combined
annual food store sales of more than $500 million annually. They said
that retail food store chain acquisitions which result in combined
sales of less than $500 million annually would not be immune from at-
tention, but that they would reserve their "greatest diligence" for those
over $500 million. (It will be remembered that in Von's Grocery, the
sales of the merged firms totaled $170 million annually.)
In its May, 1968, release respecting product-extension mergers in
grocery product manufacturing, the Commission said it would give
specific merger enforcement consideration to such mergers where the
combined company would have assets in excess of $250 million and
where the acquiring company engages in extensive promotional efforts
and is among the top eight producers of any one important grocery
product or accounts for more than five per cent of a relevant market. 46
The fourth Federal Trade Commission enforcement policy an-
nouncement in the merger area was released November 22, 1968,
respecting mergers in the textile mill products industry. The Com-
mission stated that the enforcement policy was ". . . issued to provide
business organizations with guidance as to the kinds of future mergers
in the textile mill products industry most likely to raise ques-
tions . . .,47 under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Celler-Kefauver Act. Here again, the Commission was relating its ef-
forts to a narrow spectrum of industry and was exceedingly precise
in its enforcement policy statement.48
46. Cf. F.T.C. v. Proctor-Gamble-Clorox, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
47. FTC News Release.
48. It said it would examine prospective and future mergers as follows:
1. Any merger between textile mill product firms where the combined sales or assets
of the firms exceeds $300 million and the sales or assets of the smaller firm in the
merger exceeds $10 million.
2. Any horizontal merger in a textile mill product submarket where (1) the combined
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Of course, it should be made clear in considering either Federal
Trade Commission or Department of Justice guidelines that both
government offices still maintain their availability to offer approval
or disapproval prior to the consummation of any prospective merger
or acquisition. Both agencies have indicated that they will continue
to provide advisory opinions regarding the legality of particular pro-
posed mergers and that they invite those contemplating mergers to
avail themselves of these programs in any situation where they are
uncertain as to the legality of a prospective merger.
To implement some of these industry guides, the Commission an-
nounced that it would each year send a FTC Act Order (Section 6(b))
which would require each cement producer and every food retailer
and wholesaler to give the Commission at least 60 days advance notice
of any proposed acquisition covered by the policy statements.
Interesting legal problems could arise out of this unorthodox use
of the Commission's authority under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act. It
is to be remembered that the Commission and the Justice Department
have been asking Congress for many years to pass a law requiring
companies to give advance notification of merger plans. Now by this
announced procedure, applicable at least to the two industries for
which FTC early issued guides, the Commission seems to be asserting
that it has the power to require pre-merger notification under its exist-
ing statute. They have not included this direction in the two later
guides.
But then the Commission went much farther in April, 1969, by
issuing a pre-merger notification resolution. 49 This resolution an-
nounced that for each merger or acquisition involving firms with
firms rank among the top 4 or (2) have a combined market share of 5 per cent or
more of any submarket in which the four largest firms account for 35 per cent or
more of the market.
3. Any vertical merger, either "backward" into the supplying market or "forward"
into a purchasing market, where a particular acquisition or series of acquisitions
may involve market shares of 10 per cent or more of the relevant market or where
the acquisition or series of acquisitions may tend significantly to raise barriers to
entry in either market or to disadvantage existing non-integrated or partially
integrated firms in either market by denying them fair access to sources of supply
or markets.
4. Any acquisition of a textile mill product firm with sales or assets of $100 million or
more and ranking among the four largest producers of a textile mill product by a
non-textile mill product firm with sales or assets in excess of $250 million and with a
substantial market position in another industry. A substantial market position is
defined as being one of the top four sellers of a product or service in which the
four largest companies account for 40 per cent or more of the market.
News release.
49. Resolution, Federal Trade Commission, Notification of Large Corporate Mergers,
April 8, 1969, TRADE REG. REP., Vol. 1, Par. 4455.
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assets of $10 million or more and if the total assets of the firms in-
volved exceeded $250 million that the firms must notify the Com-
mission of the transaction and render special reports to the Commis-
sion about it within ten days after any agreement or understanding
is reached to merge and no less than 60 days prior to the consummation
of the merger or acquisition. Also, any acquiring corporation with
assets of $250 million or more which obtains ten per cent or more
of the voting stock of another corporation with assets of $10 million
or more is to file a special report with the Commission within ten
days after that event. The resolution also provided that where an
acquiring corporation effects a stock acquisition which will result
in it holding 50% or more of the voting stock of another corporation
with assets of $10 million or more, any such acquiring corporation
with assets of $250 million or more shall file a special report with the
Commission and notify it.
This time the Commission's Resolution did not refer to any par-
ticular clause in its statute, although its Merger Notification Report
Form "broadly asserts" "[This Report] is mandatory under the authority
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 46)."50
It will be interesting to observe whether merging firms comply with
this Resolution-issued, again, although Congress has often con-
sidered but has not passed a pre-notification statute.51
ANTITRUST DIVISION GUIDELINES
In the meantime, on May 30, 1968, the Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division released its guidelines outlining its standards for deter-
mining whether to oppose corporate acquisitions or mergers under Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.52 This important document entails an entirely
different approach than that of the Federal Trade Commission in that
the Department does not focus on any particular defined industry but
50. Id.
51. See, for example, H.R. 2511 (CelIer), 90th Congress, and predecessor bills in earlier
Congresses. It will be remembered that an apparent attempt by the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, to seek preacquisition information using a Civil Investigative
Demand under 15 U.S.C. § 1312 was not permitted by a U.S. District Court, In Re
Petition of Union Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Calif., 1963).
There is a respectable question whether the F.T.C. can find specific legal support in its
Act for this notification requirement, or can combat the assertion that the release con-
stitutes rule-making. See N.L.R.B. v. Wyman Gordon Co., U.S. Supreme Court, April 23,
1969, 37 U.S. LAw WEEK 4365.
52. "Merger Guidelines," U,S. Department of Justice, May 30, 1968, TRADE RE. RYP.,
Vol. 1, Par. 4430.
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instead attempts general guidelines for any horizontal merger, vertical
merger, or conglomerate merger. The policy announced entailed a
market structure analysis approach. The department said:
Within the over-all scheme of the Department's antitrust en-
forcement activity, the primary role of Section 7 enforcement is
to preserve and promote market structures conducive to competi-
tion. Market structure is the focus of the Department's merger
policy chiefly because the conduct of the individual firms in a
market tends to be controlled by the structure of that market, i.e.,
by those market conditions which are fairly permanent or subject
only to slow change (such as, principally, the number of sub-
stantial firms selling in the market, the relative sizes of their re-
spective market shares, and the substantiality of barriers to the
entry of new firms into the market). Thus, for example, a con-
centrated market structure, where a few firms account for a large
share of the sales, tends to discourage vigorous price competition
by the firms in the market and to encourage other kinds of con-
duct, such as use of inefficient methods of production or excessive
promotional expenditures, of an economically undesirable nature.
Moreover, not only does emphasis on market structure generally
produce economic predictions that are fully adequate for the pur-
poses of a statute that requires only a showing that the effect of a
merger 'may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly,' but an enforcement policy emphasizing a lim-
ited number of structural factors also facilitates both enforcement
decision-making and business planning which involves anticipation
of the Department's enforcement intent. Accordingly, the Depart-
ment's enforcement activity under Section 7 is directed primarly
toward the identification and prevention of those mergers which
alter market structure in ways likely now or eventually to en-
courage or permit noncompetitive conduct. 53
In its attempt to be helpful in indicating to managers and their
counsel what they may or may not assay, the Antitrust Division at-
tempted to be quite precise. 54 The Department of Justice also spells
53. Id.
54. Here is an excerpt from the guideline with respect to horizontal acquisitions:
Market Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the shares of the four largest
firms amount to approximately 75% or more, the Department will ordinarily
challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the following per-
centages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
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out what it will do with respect-to mergers which affect at least two
categories of economic activity as a result of a conglomerate acquisi-
tion. One of these is mergers involving potential entrance and the
other is mergers creating a danger of reciprocal buying. The Depart-
ment also has important remarks included with respect to so-called
"deep pocket" effects of conglomerate mergers.
The Department of Justice's "Merger Guidelines" are an excellant
compilation of existing merger law-and that accomplishment should
not be deprecated, but they offer nothing new. They constitute a
summation of recent cases brought together as their accumulated
result. They provide a convenient "numbers game" of market sale
figures. But at least the manager and his legal counsel have some
criterion against which to compare their intended acquisition. In some
cases they can see that they are sure to be right; and indeed in others
they will see that they are sure to risk litigation.
The guidelines offer at least one concept in better form than appears
in any of the cases. This would inquire into the concentration ratio
existing in the market in determining whether or not an acquisition-
in this case horizontal-would be allowed. With respect to this con-
sideration, the Division said:
Market With Trend Toward Concentration. The Department
applies an additional, stricter standard in determining whether to
challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly uncon-
concentrated, in which there is a significant trend toward in-
creased concentration. Such a trend is considered to be present
(Percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated proportionately
to the percentages that are shown.)
Market Less Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the shares of the four
largest firms amount to less than approximately 75 per cent, the Department will
ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the
following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
,10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
(Percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated proportionately
to the percentages that are shown).
Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice, May 30, 1968, TRADE REG. REP. Vol. 1,
4430.
With respect to this kind of a measurable quantitative approach, the Department
similarly made its guidelines precisely clear on vertical acquisitions. (This paper does not
attempt to fully review the content of these or the Federal Trade Commission's guide-
lines. That has already been done elsewhere. See, for instance, Mergers and Markets: 7, by
Betty Bock, National Industrial Conference Board, 1969).
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when the aggregate market share of any grouping of the largest
firms in the market from the two largest to the eight largest has
increased by approximately 7 per cent or more of the market over
a period of time extending from any base year 5-10 years prior to
the merger (excluding any year in which some abnormal fluctua-
tion in market shares occurred) up to the time of the merger. The
Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisition, by any firm
in a grouping of such largest firms showing the requisite increase
in market share, of any firm whose market share amounts to ap-
proximately 2 per cent or more.55
MoRE GUIDANCE STILL NEEDED?
But still under the guidelines, as they are used, the issue in every case
will be the question of the definition of the relevant market. We may
recall from Brown Shoe that "Congress neither adopted nor rejected
specifically any particular tests for measuring the relevant markets..."56
The basic questions then universally remain-what economic criteria
are available other than those developed on an ad hoc basis, and are
there any economic criteria or empirical data available which will assist
us in achieving a rational and useful national economic concentration
and merger policy?
Mr. Justice Harlan in the Proctor & Gamble concurring decision
might have given tacit approval to fairly precise structural guidelines.
In that decision he seemed to think that the development of cases up to
that time had taken us to a point where we did at least have useful guide-
lines with respect to horizontal and vertical acquisitions. He said that
with respect to these two types of acquisition, ". . the responsible
agencies have moved away from an initial emphasis on comprehensive
scrutiny and have opted for more precise rules of thumb which provide
advantages of administrative convenience and predictability for the
business world."5 7
Surely in the present proliferation of conglomerate acquisitions
there is need for strenuous research for empirical data respecting the
effects of such acquisitions upon the economy and society and the
nation.
We are entering a period in which we are building more and more of
a novel form of corporate structure far from anything the founders of
55. Id. at 6684.
56. 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962).
57. 386 U.S. 568, 589-90 (1967).
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the Republic may have intended a corporation to become and which
entails economic consequences not yet analyzed or pondered.
As a concept, the conglomerate merger replaces the managerial
revolution which took control away from the owners and invested it
in managers, replacing it, in turn, with a system in which control is
taken away from managers and invested in financiers. Whether this will
produce the kind of economic system the people of the United States
want for their country is a question which goes to the heart of the
American free enterprise philosophy. If control at one remove from
ownership is open to serious question, what is control at two removes?
THE 1969 TASK FORCES
In December, 1967, President Johnson appointed a Task Force on
Antitrust Policy to study the antitrust laws and determine how antitrust
policy might be strengthened by new legislative or administrative mea-
sures. The Task Force reported back to the President on July 5, 1968,
but the report was not released until May 21, 1969. The Chairman of
this Task Force was Phil C. Neal, Dean of the Law School, The Uni-
versity of Chicago.
Within two weeks yet another "task force" suddenly surfaced. It
called itself the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, and it is
being called the "Nixon Task Force."58 The chairman of this Task
Force was Professor George J. Stigler.
THE "JOHNSON" TASK FORCE ON ANITITRUST POLICY
This report recommends changes in the antitrust laws dealing with
concentrated industries, conglomerate mergers, the Robinson-Patman
Act having to do with price and services and facilities discriminations,
certain aspects of patent licensing, and the improvement of economic
data relevant to antitrust matters.
The Task Force 59 chose to make its recommendations in the form of
proposing specific legislation. With respect to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act they made the following recommendation:
58. There is little or no real importance in the "Johnson" and "Nixon" presidential
labels except that they are being used in discussion by some for identification purposes.
59. This Task Force consisted of: Phil C. Neal, Chairman, William F. Baxter,
Robert H. Bork, Carl H. Fulda, William K. Jones, Dennis G. Lyons, Paul W. MacAvoy,
James W. McKie, Lee E. Preston, James A. Rahl, George D. Reycraft, Richard E. Sher-
wood, and S. Paul Posner, Staff Director.
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Passage of a statute which would flatly prohibit any acquisition by
a large firm (a firm with $500 million in annual sales or $250
million in assets) of any "leading firm" (a firm with a market share
greater than 10 per cent in a market where four or fewer firms have
50 per cent of the market and industry sales exceed $100 million).60
This suggestion may well have been at least partially adopted by the
Nixon administration in the speech made by Attorney General John N.
Mitchell on June 6, 1969, when he said,
The Department of Justice may well oppose any merger among
the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in
other industries. The Department of Justice will probably oppose
any merger by one of the top 200 manufacturing firms with any
leading producer in any concentrated industry.
In his speech the Attorney General acknowledged that this position
may be regarded, ". . . as something of an expansion of the published
anti-merger guidelines of the Department ..... 61
Most importantly, the Neal Task Force also proposed improvement
in the quality and availability of economic and financial data relevant
to the formulation of antitrust policy, the enforcement of the antitrust
laws, and the operation of competitive markets. Specifically, they recom-
mended the formation of a standing committee of representatives of the
Census Bureau and other government agencies which gather or use
economic information to consider the following:
(1) improving the gathering and presentation of economic informa-
tion within the statutory limits on disclosure of information on
individuals; (2) new interpretations of existing laws or, eventually,
new legislation to minimize restrictions on disclosure of types of
information which are not highly sensitive from the point of view
of individual firms but are of great value in the formulation of
policy and the application of law; and (3) machinery for developing
information on the competitive structure of relevant markets .... 62
THE "NIXON" TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION
This Task Force 63 recommended administration support of a pol-
icy of competition employing the Antitrust Division and the reg-
60. White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, submitted July 5, 1968
(reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 411, May 27, 1969, Part II at 15)
(hereinafter cited as Neal Report).
61. Emphasis added. See note 14 supra.
62. Neal Report supra note 59.
63. Members of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition were: George J.
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ulatory commissions, free entry into regulated industries, and increased
emphasis upon economic factors and the advice of economists in
implementing antitrust policy. The emphasis of enforcement, in their
view, should be upon price-fixing violations and Section 1 Sherman
Act situations, accompanied by increased fines for such violations. With
respect to oligopoly they said:
We cannot endorse, on the basis of present knowledge of the
effects of oligopoly on competition, proposals whether by new
legislation or new interpretations of existing law to deconcentrate
highly concentrated industries by dissolving their leading firms.
But we urge the Department to maintain unremitting scrutiny
of highly oligopolistic industries and to proceed under section 1
of the Sherman Act-which in our judgment reaches all impor-
tant forms of collusion-in instances where pricing is found after
careful investigation to be substantially noncompetitive. 64
They strongly criticized the Department of Justice Merger Guide-
lines as ". . . extraordinarily stringent, and in some respects indefen-
sible." And they emphatically recommended against a program of
action against conglomerates, ". . . pending a conference to gather
information and opinion on the economic effects of the conglomerate
phenomenon."6 5
They also recommended review of existing antitrust decrees and a
policy of inserting a termination date in decrees, which are now often
in effect in perpetuity. They called for repeal of the Expediting Act 60
and the Webb-Pomerene Act,6 7 and for substantial revision of Robin-
son-Patman.
THE Two REPORTS TOGETHER
Last year, 1969, began with the opening of a new Congress which
had few important recommendations for antitrust law revision.68
Stigler, Chairman, Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Ronald H. Coase, Roger S. Crampton,
Kenneth W. Dam, Raymond H. Mulford, Richard A. Posner, Peter 0. Steiner, Alex-
ander 0. Stott.
64. Task Force Report on Productivity and Competition (reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST
& TRADE REGULATION REP., No. 413, June 10, 1969, at X-l) (hereinafter cited as Stigler
Report).
65. Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 28, 29.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 61-65.
68. It seemed probable that the Expediting Act (which accords a direct appeal from
the trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court in civil equity antitrust suits brought by the
United States as plaintiff) might be repealed to reduce the case load burden of the Su-
preme Court. But otherwise most recommended legislation given any chance of serious
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These two Task Force reports, issued since the opening of Congress,
together constitute the most comprehensive overview of national anti-
trust policy since the Report of the Attorney General's Committee
in 1955.69 If discussion of these two reports develops they may prove
to be as important as the 1955 Report, or as its pre-war predecessor,
T.N.E.C. TO The Neal group's report is far more thorough and its
recommendations are more specific. However a far more important
conclusion must be that where the two make parallel recommenda-
tions, e.g., major surgery upon the Robinson-Patman Act, they are
making far weightier proposals for antitrust change than Congress,
the business community, or the antitrust bar has been contemplating.
There can be no doubt that these recommendations merit, and will
receive, considerable examination and study.
The two groups are directly opposed in their recommendations
respecting concentration. The Neal group suggests a stunning new
proposal, a "Concentrated Industries Act," employing divestiture to
reduce concentration in industries where monopoly power is shared
by a few large firms, to supplement Section Two of the Sherman Act.
On this subject the Stigler group demurs. Stigler reserves his attack
for classic hard core restraints, including, of course, price-fixing, but
argues lack of data to support new policies opposed to concentration.
The Administration's recent vigorous anti-conglomerate policy 7'
is not supported by the Stigler group, but, as previously mentioned, is
more in accord with Neal group suggestions. Here again Stigler's Task
Force argues that there is lack of sufficient information.
consideration seemed to be in the consumer-protection area rather than dealing directly
with the antitrust laws.
69. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
U.S. Government Printing Office, March 31, 1955.
70. Hearings and Report of the Temporary National Economic Committee, Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939.(In a larger sense, of course, neither the 1955 Committee Report nor the two current
Task Force Reports are comparable to T.N.E.C. Where both the current reports call for
additional quality and availability of economic and financial data relevant to the formu-
lation of antitrust policy, T.N.E.C. stood alone in that it sought its data during its
extended investigation).
71. Beginning promptly after the inauguration in the Spring of 1969 the new ad-
ministration has sought to block the take-over of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation
by Ling-Tempco-Vought; to stop Northwest Industries, a railroad-based conglomerate,
from continuing with its efforts to take over the B. F. Goodrich Company; late in June,
1969, the Justice Department announced that it planned to oppose the projected merger
of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation with the Hartford Fire In-
surance Company, one of the nation's largest casualty insurers; two months before, the
Department filed a suit against the same I.T.T.'s acquisition of Canteen Corporation,
three days after that deal had been completed. At the same time, the Federal Trade
Commission has been trying to block White Consolidated Industries from taking over
the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company.
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Stigler would have the Department of Justice decline to undertake
a program of action against conglomerate mergers and conglomerate
enterprises, pending a conference to gather information and opinion
on the economic effects of the conglomerate phenomenon.
The Stigler group sharply criticizes the Department of Justice,
May 1968, Merger Guidelines, the magnum opus of Donald Turner.
Still the recent Guidelines are the first and only secure set of criteria
upon which managers and their attorneys may depend for measure-
ment and guidance since the Celler-Kefauver Act was passed in 1950.
In its recommendation concerning conglomerate mergers, the Neal
Report further builds upon a foundation provided by the 1968 Merger
Guidelines. However, the groups concur that better economic data
and its availability for research are essential.
THE NEED FOR MORE ADEQUATE ECONOMIC DATA
In the antitrust area, and certainly in the merger and acquisition area,
the law exists only for economic purposes and reasons. It is economics
with which we are dealing.
In all of the background described above, the pre-1950 period in
which we had no effective merger law; the period after the amendment
of 1950 during which we developed such indicia as were offered to man-
agers and counsel by case law; the development of "guidelines"; and
now the present advice of Task Forces, there has been a noticeable
scarcity of applicable economic factual data relevant to the problem.
Both the Neal and Stigler Task Force Reports, although they have
disagreements on other issues, were in accord with respect to this need.
The Neal Report noted:
In the course of preparing this Report, we have been struck by
the need for improved collection, organization and availability of
financial and economic data. Such information plays several roles
in antitrust law. First, it is essential in the formulation of antitrust
policy. Second, it may be essential in the application of the anti-
trust laws, in facilitating observance of the law by businessmen and
enforcement of the law by the government. Third, it may have an
effect on the operation of competitive markets and thus have direct
antitrust implications.
The formulation of economic policy requires a variety of finan-
cial and economic information. Such information may, for ex-
ample, cast light on the competitive structure of industries, on the
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, relation between prices and costs, on industry, performance, on
merger activity and plant construction, and on numerous other
* facts of obvious relevance in the formulation of economic and
antitrust policy.72
It also recommended:
We recommend that steps be taken to improve the quality and
availability of economic and financial data relevant to the formula-
tion of antitrust policy, the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and
the operation of competitive markets.
Specifically, we recommend formation of a standing- committee
of representatives of the Census Bureau and other Government
agencies which gather or use economic informatiin to consider
(1) improving the gathering and presentation of economic informa-
tion within the statutory limits dn disclosure of information on
individual firms; (2) new interpretations of existing law, or, even-
tually, new legislation to minimize restrictions on disclosure of
types of information which are not highly sensitive fromthe point
of view of individual firms 'but are of great value in the formula-
tion of policy and the application of law; and (3) machinery -for
developing information on the competitive structure of relevant
economic markets, because such markets do not necessarily coincide
with Census industry and product classifications. These recom-
mendations could be implemented immediately, without new legis-
lation or appropriations.
In addition, the role of financial information in the operation of
competitive markets should be reflected in the formulation of
financial reporting requirements by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. These -requirements are now imposed pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of. 1934, which is oriented to investor
protection. We recommend that the Act be amended to recognize
the role of financial information in the operation of a competitive
economy, and to require that the SEC consult with antitrust en-
forcement agencies in formulating reporting requirements.
Pending adoption of this recommendation, the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies should be requested to consider submitting recom-
mendations to the SEC in connection with the current divisional
reporting inquiry.73
And, as we have already seen respecting the. Stigler report, it urged
the government to decline to continue its vigorous program against
conglomerates until there had been a conference" . to gather inforia-
72. Neal Report supra note 60 at 11.
73. Neal Report supra note 60 at 4.
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tion and opinion on the economic effects of the conglomerate phe-
nomenon."
Discussing "The Utilization of Economic Knowledge," they recom-
mended:
We anticipate little opposition to the proposition that the Anti-
trust Division make full and effective use of economists and their
special skills. These skills are often necessary to understand the
effects of economic practices (an example is market-sharing in fixed
proportions), to assess the economic importance of individual cases,
and to assist in devising remedies that will not shatter on economic
realities. We endorse the policy of having a highly professional
economist serving as adviser to the head of the Division, and a
strong permanent staff of economists.
The problem is not the goal of an economically sophisticated
antitrust policy, but its implementation. A division charged with
the enforcement of a statute must of course be directed and largely
staffed by lawyers. Unless there are substantial incentives to the
staff to utilize economics-whether by central direction, or vastly
more powerfully, by demonstrated assistance in winning cases-the
non-lawyer will often be viewed by the lawyers as a mysteriously
necessary obstacle to smooth operations. The Assistant Attorney
General will have succeeded in making a truly major contribu-
tion to antitrust policy if he establishes the relevance of economic
knowledge. 74
Again, it is evident that we have been proceeding without data as
particular as both of these groups and many others would desire. In-
deed, it would seem that we have been proceeding in this important
field involving enormous resources guided only by an instinctive Jeffer-
sonianism. A constant reiteration of this Jeffersonianism by the courts
has already been noted. This writer is not disinclined to trust an instinct
for the Jeffersonian-Brandeisian-Learned Hand preference for many
producers of modest size. "It is possible, because of its indirect social
or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent
for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few."' 75 When
Learned Hand said this he directly distinguished it from economic
measurement, saying, ". . . [Congress] was not necessarily actuated by
economic motives alone. ' '7 6 But if there is other data than such instinct
74. Stigler Report supra note 64 at X-2.
75. 148 F.2d 416 at 427.
76. Id.
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available, and I am sure the economists would now inform us that there
is at least more available than ever before, it would seem that it should
at least be consulted and possibly used in making these decisions.
There have not been any important economic investigations in the
area since T.N.E.C., and perhaps the 1948 Federal Trade Commission
investigation which preceded the 1950 amendment to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The 1955 inquiry into the antitrust laws by the Attorney
General's Committee was largely a legal affair. The 1969 Task Force
Reports of the Neal and Stigler groups were not based upon new
economic inquiry, they merely concurred in calling for such new eco-
nomic investigation. It may be hoped, it may hereby be respectfully
recommended, that the two 1969 Task Force Reports will spur knowl-
edgeable persons in the economic-legal community to obtain better
data to support the economic decisions we have been making.
If economic data to support present policy or to recommend changes
in present policy or to recommend changes in present policy is brought
forward, of course, it will have to be constantly noted that such data
may well vary from industry to industry and from market to market.
This may be the most sensitive critical point in the Department of
Justice's valiant attempt to furnish us "merger guidelines." Four per
cent of an economic market for motor trucks may be quantitatively
quite different than four per cent of a horizontal market for toys. Here,
the Neal report calls for some compromise with what is practicable.
They suggest that we must limit the economic issues within boundaries
defined by the availability and manageability of economic information.
Certainly the policies of government should be designed to obtain
the objectives of the economy, including efficiency in production of
goods and services with a minimum expenditure of the economy's
resources, and opportunity for growth for those enterprises which per-
form relatively more efficiently, an opportunity for growth for those
enterprises which show ability to innovate in production methods and
in products, and finally insurance that the fruits of these efficiencies and
innovations are passed on to the benefit of the society in general.
But presently we are allowing such decisions to be made sometimes
for other, more narrow, effects. One may form a conglomerate to smooth
out peaks and valleys in that particular conglomerate enterprise, or to
invest idle cash, or to obtain effective power and publicity, or because
of a possible, perhaps temporary, effect upon stock market price, or for
tax considerations which may or may not be related to economic ad-
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vantages or disadvantages to the society as a whole, or to obtain certain
wanted real estate sites or certain wanted personnel or technical know-
how or patents. It has not been unusual in recent conglomeration his-
tory for a merger to occur in order to forestall some other unwanted
take-over-that is, unwanted by the managers of one of the enterprises
for any of their own particular reasons including some of those just
given. These motives are inappropriate to the objectives of the economy
just stated. Our decisions here should not be based on these considera-
tions.
On the other hand, the conglomerate is not "all bad." It may well
produce some effects which may be substantially to improve competi-
tion. The conglomerate acquirer may lie the only free person in the
economy having enough capital to overcome entry barriers in an in-
dustry. The entering conglomerate acquirer may furnish management
techniques not previously practiced in the industry which will provide
more vigorous competition than the unaffiliated acquired firm formerly
furnished. A conglomerate may well not be a monopolist or oligopolist
in all or many or even a few of the industries and markets in which
he participates. He may be relatively small in each of his markets but
still furnish some of the advantages of composite strength.
So it comes down to who is making the decisions and what data is he
using to help him make those decisions. We have chosen a system in
which the large number of decisions are made by free individuals in the
marketplace. The Stigler Task Force says, "The American Way, as we
are constantly told, is to rely'upon competitive private enterprise to do
most of the..work of allocating resources to industries and finns, organiz-
ing production, and providing economic progress." In his Georgia Bar
Association address, Attorney General Mitchell noted, "We only oppose
about 20 out of every 1,000 mergers because the vast majority are not
anticompetitive." But where the effect is thought to be anticompetitive,
our government acts. We have seen that the Congress has authorized
broad discretion here in the language it chose for Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as amended. We have seen that we presently have vigorous
administrative enforcement. It is the conclusion of this paper that this
is acceptable policy, but with the admonition, beneficially derived
from the work of both of the recent Task Forces, that there be increased
use of already available, more recently sophisticated, economic data in
carrying out this policy.
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